Abstract. In this paper, distributed games for large-population multiagent systems with random time-varying parameters are investigated, where the agents are coupled via their individual costs and the structure parameters are a family of independent Markov chains with identical generators. The cost function of each agent is a long-run average tracking-type functional with an unknown mean field coupling nonlinear term as "reference signal." To reduce the computational complexity, the mean field approach is applied to construct distributed strategies. The population statistics effect (PSE) is used to approximate the average effect of all the agents, and the distributed strategies are given through solving a Markov jump tracking problem. Here the PSE is a deterministic quantity and can be obtained by solving the Stackelberg equilibrium of an auxiliary two-player game. It is shown that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable, and the distributed strategies are asymptotically optimal in the sense of Nash equilibrium, as the number of agents grows to infinity. A numerical example is provided to demonstrate the procedure of designing the strategies as well as the influence of the heterogeneity intensity and the parameter jump rate of the agents on the closed-loop system. Key words. mean field approach, multiagent system, distributed game, Markov jump parameter, optimal control AMS subject classifications. 91A10, 91A23, 93E20, 68M14 DOI. 10.1137/100800324
1. Introduction. In recent years, there has been a drastically increasing interest in control and optimization of multiagent systems (MASs) among the system and control community. The optimization problem of MASs in game-theoretic framework, though not investigated extensively, has attracted the attention of many researchers [3, 16, 18, 24, 25, 29, 32] . In this paper, we will study the problems of distributed games for large-population MASs, which are widely existent in economics, engineering, biology, and social sciences, for instance, production output planning in oligopoly markets [21] , dynamic models of advertising competition [9, 10] , wireless communication networks [6, 15] , swarming and flocking [31, 13, 8] , and voluntary vaccination games [2] .
Mean field (MF) approaches play an important role in diverse fields of physics and chemistry (e.g., the derivation of Boltzman or Vlasov equations in the kinetic gas theory). Recently, the areas investigated by the MF approaches have been extended to game theory, economics, and finance. Several papers [14, 16, 18, 5] investigated the large-population stochastic differential games on wireless communications and gave ε-Nash equilibrium strategies by the Nash certainty equivalence methodology. Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy [36, 37] studied discrete-time large-scale stochastic dynamic games on microeconomics and introduced the notion of oblivious equilibrium via MF approximation. Lasry and Lions [22, 23] presented an MF model and a limit equation for economic and financial systems. The class of large-population games investigated via the MF approach has the following features: each agent is affected by the average interaction of all the other agents, while the individual influence of each agent is negligible. The key idea of tackling this class of game problems is to transform the large population game into a single-agent optimal control problem by replacing the average effect of all the agents to a single agent with the macroscopic population information. This could make us transfer a high-dimensional problem into a lowdimensional problem and hence reduce the computational complexity dramatically.
There have been many works [16, 17, 18, 24, 25, 27, 19, 29, 38] investigating the large population MASs by using the MF approaches. The papers [16, 17, 18, 19] investigated stochastic differential games for large-population systems with agents coupled via their discounted costs. Li and Zhang [25, 24] considered decentralized games for large-population stochastic MASs with stochastic time-average coupled cost functions. Nourian et al. [29] considered leader-follower dynamic games, where trajectories of the leaders are unknown but in a given finite class of models. Zhang and Zhang [38] investigated the robust adaptive control of MASs with unknown parameters and unmodeled dynamics. However, to our knowledge, the systems with random timevarying parameters have not yet been investigated, which have a strong background in practical application and are definitely worth deeply studying.
For instance, consider an example of production processes in N companies. In a market, N companies supply the same products. The production line in each company consists of multiple machines. In the practical production, it is unavoidable that some machines fail. The production lines in all the companies are the same by and large, while the production lines in different companies operate independently. This kind of system can be characterized by an MAS with parameters modeled by a family of independent Markov chains with identical generators. The study of the similar fault-prone dynamics characterized by Markov jump systems may trace back to [33] and [4] . Through the development in several decades, many deep results have been obtained [34, 35, 20, 28, 12, 7] in this direction. This paper is aimed at investigating distributed games for a class of large-population MASs, where the agents are coupled together via cost functions with nonlinear average terms and with time-varying parameters characterized by a sequence of independent Markov chains with identical generators. Although a range of mature techniques and results for Markov jump systems (particularly, for the linear case [28, 7] ) have been developed, the results cannot be extended to MASs in parallel. The main reason is that in the MASs, not only agents have autonomy and self-governing capability, but also there may exist all kind of interactions (e.g., competition and cooperation) among the agents.
In this paper, we will use the MF approach to design the distributed strategies. To do so and analyze uniform stability of the closed-loop system and asymptotic optimality of the distributed strategies, we need to approximate the average effect of all the agents by the population statistics effect (PSE), which can be obtained by solving the equilibrium problem of an auxiliary two-player Stackelberg game. Compared with the time-invariant case, one key difficulty encountered here is to solve a fixed point problem of an operator. For the time-invariant case, the operator can be expressed explicitly and the existence of the fixed point problem is easy to solve. However, for the case of Markov jump parameters, the operator is very complicated and the fixed point problem is hard to analyze. To overcome this difficulty, we first construct a stochastic Lyapunov function and then use the differential inequality and its solution related to the Lyapunov function to study the contraction property of the operator and analyze the existence of the fixed point problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model and basic assumptions. In section 3, we first give the solution of Markov jump linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) optimal tracking control problem and then obtain a fixed point equation for the PSE and the conditions under which the equation admits a unique solution. Based on these, we give a group of distributed control strategies. In section 4, we analyze the stability of closed-loop systems. In section 5, we show that distributed strategies are asymptotically optimal in the sense of the Nash equilibrium. In section 6, we give a detailed discussion for the case where the cost functions are with linear effect terms and simplify the condition given in section 3 to one easier to be verified. In section 7, we give a numerical example to demonstrate the procedure of the control design and the influence of the heterogeneity intensity and the parameter jump rate of the agents on the closed-loop system. In section 8, we provide a brief summary for the paper.
The following notation will be used in the paper. · denotes the Euclidean vector norm or matrix norm induced by Euclidean vector norm; I denotes an n-dimensional identity matrix; 1 denotes the m-dimensional column vector whose elements are 1; e j denotes the column vector whose elements are 0 except that the jth element is 1. For a given matrix A, A T denotes its transpose and tr(A) denotes the trace of A. For any vector x with proper dimensions and symmetric matrix Q ≥ 0, x Q = (x T Qx) 1/2 . For an n-dimensional matrix P , λ 1 (P ) denotes the minimum eigenvalue of P and λ n (P ) denotes maximum eigenvalue of P . I B denotes the indicator function of set
Problem formulation.
In the paper, we consider the MAS described by the following dynamics:
where x i ∈ R n and u i ∈ R r are the state and input of agent i, respectively, and
is an external signal, reflecting the impact on the agent i by the environment. {θ i (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N } is a sequence of independent continuous-time Markov chains taking value in S = {1, 2, . . . , m} with the identical infinitesimal generator (transition rate matrix) Λ = {λ ij , i, j = 1, . . . , m}. {W i (t)} and {θ i (t)} are independent of each other. The cost function of agent i is
Here Φ[Ψ (N ) (x)] gives a measure of the average effect caused by all the agents and both Φ and Ψ are known functions from R n to R n , called effect functions. Remark 2.1. Model (2.1) with the cost function (2.2) has a wide economic background. For instance, let us continue to consider the example of the production processes in N companies mentioned in the introduction. In a market, an increasing number of companies distributed over diverse areas join together to serve an increasing number of customers. As it is known, supply-demand relationship affects market price. Hence, we can assume that the following relation holds:
where p denotes the market price, x i denotes the output level of company i, and
3) is a variant form of the price model in [21] and [18] . Now, we assume each company raises its output level as the price goes up. Specifically, each company adjusts its output level to make it satisfy the following relationship:
where φ is an increasing function. Thus, for company i, the following cost function needs to be investigated:
Here the penalty term 2) degenerates to the model studied in [24] . If θ i (t) ≡ θ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N and the state variable x i is 1-dimensional, then the system (2.1)-(2.2) degenerates to the model studied in [16] . Hence, this paper extends the models in the existing works [24, 16] from the time-invariant case to the case of random time-varying parameters.
The objective of this paper is to seek optimal distributed strategies for the system (2.1)-(2.2) within the setting of a noncooperative game. However, due to the particular structure of the system, constructing distributed Nash equilibrium strategies by using the usual method, if feasible, generally results in a quite high computational complexity. In this paper, we will use PSE to approximate the average effect of all the agents and then design a group of distributed strategies, which is proved to be asymptotically optimal in the sense of Nash equilibrium.
For convenience of reference, we list some assumptions which will be used in the paper as follows:
(A2) Given the positive matrices N 1 , . . . , N m , the following coupled Riccati equations have a set of unique positive definite solutions {M j , j = 1, . . . , m}:
(A3) The functions Φ and Ψ are Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constants L Φ and L Ψ , i.e., for any x, y ∈ R n ,
Remark 2.3. As a game problem, we need the assumption that each agent is rational. To be specific, we assume that (i) each agent optimizes its cost function and (ii) when making decisions, each agent assumes that the others are rational. This assumption ensures the rationality of the MF approximation.
Remark 2.4. Assumption (A2), which often appears in the study on stabilization of Markov jump systems, ensures the stability of the closed-loop system [20, 11, 28] . Indeed, assumption (A2) is equivalent to stochastic stabilizability [20] of the Markov jump systemẏ
Construction of distributed strategies.
In this section, we will construct a group of distributed strategies by using the MF approach.
Since each agent is weakly coupled with others and both {θ i (t)} and {W i (t)} are independent of each other, from the MF theory and agents' rationalities we can take PSE as the average effect of all the agents to decouple the large-population system and then design distributed strategies. Generally speaking, PSE is deterministic but cannot be available beforehand. To overcome this difficulty, we first regard the PSE as a deterministic function, and all the agents use this function to construct their optimal control strategies. In this case, when the number of agents is sufficiently large, the average effect of all the agents in the closed-loop system should intuitively be close to the deterministic function.
Following this line, we shall obtain a fixed point equation, which under some conditions can be shown to have a solution. With this solution we can get the PSE of the closed-loop system. As a result, all the agents can design their own optimal strategy by using its own state and this macroscopic population information PSE. From the analysis below, one can see that to get the PSE, an auxiliary two-player game problem may be considered first, and then by solving the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game we can obtain the PSE.
Thus, we can construct distributed strategies in three steps: (I) solve the Markov jump optimal tracking problem with a deterministic reference signal; (II) give the macroscopic population information PSE approximating the average effect of all the agents; and (III) design distributed strategies.
Markov jump LQG tracking problem with a known reference signal. Consider the system
is a known reference signal. The admissible control set is
. , m, then for the system (3.1) with the cost function (3.2), the following results hold:
The coupled Riccati equations
have a set of unique positive definite solutions
(
all the eigenvalues of G T + Λ ⊗ I have negative real parts, where
(v) The optimal value of the cost function is
Moreover, if θ(t) is ergodic and the stationary distribution is {π
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.2.
Approximation of the PSE based on the MF approach. Theorem 3.1 solves a class of LQG optimal tracking problems of Markov jump system with a known reference signal. However, the reference signal in the cost function (2.2) is unknown and cannot be used directly to design control strategies. Thus, we first try to estimate the reference signal and then construct distributed strategies by using Theorem 3.1 and the MF approach.
To do so, we consider an auxiliary two-player Stackelberg hierarchical game. The state evolves according to
where W (t) and θ(t) are specified as section 3.1 and the initial state x(0) is a random variable, which has the same distribution as x i (0). The cost functions of the two players are, respectively,
where u ∈ U is the strategy of player 1 and
is the strategy of player 2. Our goal is to seek the Stackelberg equilibrium solution with player 2 acting as the leader.
Remark 3.2. The game problem (3.5)-(3.7) introduced is based on the MF approach. Player 1 is a representative agent in model (2.1). Player 2 is a virtual agent-"population." v is the population effect. Indeed, for the model of Remark 2.1, we may regard player 2 as "market" and v as price.
A usual way of seeking the Stackelberg equilibrium solution is the brute-force method [1] . Specifically, for every fixed v ∈ V, we can obtain an optimal reaction strategy u v and get a Stackelberg strategy for player 2 by minimizing
Now we solve problem (3.5)-(3.7) by the brute-force method. First, for every
, by Theorem 3.1 we obtain the optimal tracking strategy for player 1
where
Substituting u v t into (3.5), we have the closed-loop equation
if the equation
Thus, v * is a Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leader (player 2). From the above analysis, it follows that Φ(v * ) is the closed-loop PSE that we are seeking. However, an unsolved question is whether (3.9) admits a solution. For the convenience of statements, we first define an operator T :
Since both Φ and Ψ are Lipschitz continuous,
. From the definition of T , (3.9) can be rewritten as
Thus, the question becomes whether T has a fixed point. For the time-invariant case, the form of T can be given explicitly and the question can be answered comparatively more easily. However, for the case of Markov jump parameters, the question is quite complicated. Since the analytic solutions of linear differential equations with Markov jump parameters are hard to give, so is the explicit form of T . To overcome this difficulty, here we first construct a stochastic Lyapunov function and with the help of a differential inequality and its solution related to this Lyapunov function show that the operator T is contractive and has a unique fixed point.
To obtain the existence for solutions of (3.9), we need the following assumption:
Generally speaking, assumption (A4) is difficult to verify directly. However, for a class of special jump system, 1-dimensional time-invariant system, by a straightforward calculation one can see that assumption (A4) holds if and only if
Obviously, when L Φ L Ψ is small and R/Q is large, the above inequality is easy to hold. Besides, for general (nondegenerate) Markov jump cases, we shall provide a numerical example satisfying (A1)-(A4) in section 7.
denote the solution of (3.4) and (3.8) when replacing f b and v by f (g). Let
Then, from (3.4) it follows that
Using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.1(iii), we can prove that the above differential equation has a unique solution
. Then, from (3.8) it follows that
By (3.3) we have
Obviously, N j > 0 and
. , m and A be the infinitesimal generator of {θ(t), Δx(t)} satisfying (3.11). Then
which leads to
Noting Δx(0) = 0, from the above differential inequality it follows that
which implies
Thus, we have
By assumption (A4) and (3.12), T is a contraction mapping on C b ([0, ∞), R n ), which yields the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point v * such that T v * = v * .
Design of distributed strategies.
From the analysis and conclusion of sections 3.1 and 3.2, we obtain a group of distributed strategies as follows:
where K j is the solution of (3.3),
and v * is the unique solution of (3.9). By Theorem 3.1 and (3.9), r * j (t) and K j merely depend on A j , B j , R j , Q j (j = 1, . . . , m), Φ, Ψ, which are unrelated to the agents' states x i (t) in real time. Hence, (3.13) are distributed strategies. In addition, since T is a contraction, v
. Thus, we can use an iterative algorithm to approximate the solution of (3.9).
Stability of closed-loop system.
Substituting the control strategies (3.13) into (2.1), we have the closed-loop system equation
Now, we study the uniform stability of the closed-loop system in a time-average sense. 
Proof. By Theorem 3.1(iii) we have
. . , m, and A i be the infinitesimal generator of {θ i (t),
By Dynkin's formula [30] we have
From this and the comparison principle it follows that
which together with the definition of EV (θ i (t), x * i (t)) results in
By (3.13) and (4.3) we have
Thus, from (4.4) and (4.5) it follows that lim sup
Noting that M r and M 1 are independent of i, N , take
Then, by (4.6) one can get (4.2).
Analysis of optimality.
We first analyze the property of the estimation for the average effect of population and then show the asymptotic optimality of distributed strategies (3.13).
Lemma 5.1. If assumptions (A1)-(A4) hold, then under the group of the strategies (3.13), the closed-loop system (4.1) satisfies
Proof. From Ψ's Lipschitz continuity and Theorem 4.1 it follows that for any
Since {θ i (t), i = 1, . . . , N} is a sequence of independent Markov chains, {W i (t), i = 1, . . . , N} is a sequence of independent Brownian motions, and {x i (0), i = 1, . . . , N} are independent of each other, by the closed-loop system equation (4.1) we get that {x * i (t), i = 1, . . . , N} are independent of each other. Hence, noting v
which holds uniformly with repsect to t. Thus, (5.1) is true.
Remark 5.2. Lemma 5.1 tells us that PSE is a good estimate of the average effect of all the agents in some sense and shows the rationality of the MF approach from a mathematical viewpoint.
called an ε-Nash equilibrium with respect to the group of cost functions
Now we give the result of asymptotic optimality of the strategies (3.13). 
Here x i is referred to the closed-loop solution of the system (2.1) corresponding to some control strategy u i ∈ U g,i .
Proof of Theorem 5.4. From Lemma 5.5 it follows that
which together with Definition 5.3 leads to the conclusion.
Remark 5.6. Theorem 5.4 implies that {u * i , i = 1, . . . , N} is an ε-Nash equilibrium. Noting that U g,i is a centralized strategy set, by Definition 5.3 the group of distributed strategies {u * i , i = 1, . . . , N} is asymptotically optimal in Nash equilibrium sense with respect to the centralized strategy set.
6. Discussion on the case of costs with linear effect functions. In general, assumption (A4) of Theorem 3.4 is hard to verify directly. However, for some special case where the effect function Ψ is linear, we can get some conditions that are easier to verify.
In this section, for the system (2.1) with the cost function (2.2), we will consider the case where the effect function Ψ is linear. That is, the cost function for agent i is
To do so, we need the following assumptions: (A1 ) {x i (0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N } are independent r.v.s with the identical expectation and independent of {W i (t)} and {θ i (t)}. For any 1
Remark 6.1. Compared with (A1) and (A4), assumption (A1 ) is more general and assumption (A4 ) is easier to verify. Particularly, for a 1-dimensional timeinvariant system, (A4 ) holds if and only if
Now we provide a group of distributed strategies for the system (2.1) with the cost function (6.1) by using the MF approach.
First, similar to section 3.2, we consider an auxiliary Stackelberg game with two players. The state also evolves according to (3.5) . The cost functions of two players are, respectively,
Now we solve problem (3.5), (6.2), and (6.3) by the brute-force method. First, for every fixed
, by Theorem 3.1 we get the optimal tracking strategy for player 1,
(6.5) Substituting (6.4) into (3.5), we get the closed-loop equation
If the equation
Next we investigate the existence conditions for solutions of (6.6). Let ϕ j (t) = I [θ(t)=j] , j = 1, . . . , m. Then, from [26] it follows that
where M j (t) is a square-integrable martingale. By Itô's formula we have
where W, M j (t) is the cross-variation process between W (t) and M j (t). Since {W (t)} and {θ(t)} are independent of each other, we have W, M j (t) = 0. Letting L j (t) = E[x(t)ϕ j (t)] and p j (t) = P (θ(t) = j) and taking expectations on both sides of (6.7), we get
and hence,
Then, by (6.8) we have
By the definition of L(t) and T 1 , (6.6) can be written as 
This together with assumption (A4 ) implies that T 1 is a contraction on C b ([0, ∞), R n ). Hence, (6.10) has a unique solution v * .
Numerical examples.
First, we give a simulation for the practical example mentioned in the introduction and Remark 2.1.
For convenience of computation, we only consider the simplest case: the production line of each company merely has two states, "work" or "failure." The output level of the ith company evolves according to
where x i ∈ R, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , {θ i (t)} is a sequence of independent Markov chains taking values in {1, 2} with the identical infinitesimal generator
and {w i (t)} is a sequence of independent 1-dimensional standard Brownian motions. The cost function of the ith company is lim sup
where φ is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant L φ .
Take a 1 = 0.1, a 2 = 0.7. Then, the Riccati equation ( For the above model and cost function, v * can be solved in an explicit form. Now we give v * . From (6.5), (6.6), and (6.8) it follows that (7.5) where
Letting the derivative term be zero, we obtain the steady-state equation set
(7.6) Solving (7.6) directly, we have r ∞ = [−6.0393
Then, by (6.5), (7.4) , and (7.5) we have
Differentiating both sides of (7.7) leads to 
, R) and (7.5), we should havẽ
In addition, from (7.3), (7.5), and (7.6) it follows that
By Theorem 3.1(iii) we havẽ
Thus, by (3.13) we get the distributed strategies
When the number of agents N = 100, the trajectories of closed-loop system are demonstrated in Figure 7 .1. It can be seen that even though all the agents achieve an agreement, the trajectories of their states fluctuate within a certain range due to the influence of Markov jump parameters. The curves of v * and β−αx
are shown in Figure 7 .2. As the number of the agents grows from 1 to 500, the curve of ε is shown in Figure 7 .3, where From Figure 7 .1, Figure 7 .4, and Figure 7 .5, we can see that, as the heterogeneity intensity is weak (i.e., |a 1 − a 2 | is small) and jump rate of the parameters is small, the consensus degree becomes high.
Concluding remarks.
The paper studies the distributed games for largepopulation MASs with random time-varying parameters. We have provided a group of distributed strategies with respect to a set of tracking-type quadratic cost functions and proved the uniform stability of the closed-loop systems and asymptotic optimality of the distributed strategies in the sense of Nash equilibrium, which extends previous works [24, 16] from the time-invariant case to the case of Markov jump parameters. Through a numerical example, we show how to design the control strategies and how the heterogeneity intensity and the parameter transition rate of each agent affect the closed-loop system. C b ([0, ∞) , R nm ). (iv)-(v) Let A t be the infinitesimal generator of (θ(t), x(t)) that satisfies (3.1). Then, by Dynkin's formula [30] we can get
θ(t), t)(B θ(t) u(t) + h(t)) dt .
This implies that
T θ(t) [K θ(t) x(t) + r(θ(t), t)]
Taking u * (t) = −R −1
θ(t) B T θ(t) [K θ(t) x(t) + r(θ(t), t)], the closed-loop system becomes dx(t) = G θ(t) x(t)dt − B θ(t) R −1 θ(t) B T θ(t) r(θ(t), t) + h(t)dt + D θ(t) dW (t). (A.5)
By [20] , [28] , and Theorem 3.1(iii), we have E x(T ) = o( √ T ) and lim sup
which gives u * ∈ U. Thus, (iv) and the first part of (v) hold. Now we prove the second part of (v). Let p j (t) = P (θ(t) = j), j = 1, . . . , m. Since π is the stationary distribution of {θ(t)}, then p j (t) → π j (t → ∞), i.e., for any ε > 0, there exist t 0 > 0 such that for any t > t 0 , |p j (t) − π j | ≤ ε. 
